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ARGUMENT 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A HEIGHTENED 
FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS. 
1. The Issue of First Impression Was Preserved Below. 
Instead of assisting this Court with a discussion of the policy considerations 
surrounding the issue on appeal1, Cookietree incorrectly asserts that the fiduciary 
duty issue was not preserved in the court below. Cookietree ignores the citations 
to the record in McLaughlin's Opening Brief and summarily asserts the issue was 
not preserved. See Appellee's Brief, p. 1, 40. The Introduction to 
McLaughlin's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment stated: 
Defendants' Motion presents an issue which is presently unsettled in 
Utah law: Who is a fiduciary in a close corporation and what is the 
extent of that duty? Defendants argue the minority position as 
articulated in the Berman and Rib let cases. McLaughlin promotes 
the majority view which has been adopted by Colorado and New 
Mexico in the Tenth Circuit. 
A1271. This Memorandum goes on to encourage the trial court to follow the 
Donahue case (A 1295), the "majority position" (A 1296-1299), and urges the 
1
 Given Cookietree's strategy in briefing, there is no opposition to the proposed 
definition of close corporations, Cookietree's categorization as such, or the 
proposed scope of duty among shareholders in a close corporation. As this Reply 
Brief is only supposed to address "new matter set forth in the opposing brief" 
these items are not reargued herein. Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
1 
extension of Utah's partnership standard to close corporations (A 1295) This 
view of the law was also argued in oral argument: 
" . . . in the context of close corporations a majority of states have 
imposed heightened duty, a duty of the utmost good faith and loyalty 
. . . A1753 at 36. " . . . [T]he reality that Your Honor is 
acknowledging is why the law imposes heightened duties on those 
controlling persons or entities to act with the utmost good faith, 
loyalty and full disclosure to those who are more powerless in such a 
context, and Utah does not have a closed corporation statutory 
scheme like some states do, and I think this Court could be very fair 
in its, within the realm of reasonableness to apply this general 
policies that are oft mentioned in other Utah cases but have not been 
expressly adopted here I'm just asking for a fair application in 
this case." 
A1753, pp. 49-50. Cookietree wholly forfeited the opportunity to address the 
policy arguments at issue and instead chose to brief a much narrower issue than 
the one presented for review on appeal. See Argument A.2., below. 
2. Cookietree Restated and Chose to Brief a Much Narrower Issue. 
In its Brief, Cookietree takes each separate damage allegation and argues 
backward: why each by itself is not a breach of fiduciary duty. In McLaughlin's 
case it is the totality of the circumstances, coupled with self-interested 
motivation, that make this a good case for a pronouncement on the law of close 
corporations. Greg Schenk used his position at Cookietree to subdue, manipulate 
and punish McLaughlin for Schenk's own personal gain. He used his power and 
control of the company to (1) acquire stock outside the terms of the shareholder's 
2 
agreement thereby securing majority ownership; (2) hide the acquisition of that 
stock; (3) deny McLaughlin the opportunity to exercise his first right of refusal to 
acquire the company; (4) negotiate only with the "strategic buyer;" and (5) get 
rid of the person with the legal standing and contractual right to challenge it all. 
a. Fiduciary Duty and Contractual Duty Can Co-Exist 
Cookietree's defends the district court's dismissal of McLaughlin's 
fiduciary duty claim by asserting contracts: the Employment Agreement and the 
1991 Shareholder's Agreement. Cookietree asserts that contract duties do not 
"translate into" fiduciary duties. See Appellee's Brief, p. 41. Cookietree does 
not address the argument that Defendants' fiduciary duties to McLaughlin arise 
by operation of law in this close corporation context. Cookietree defines the 
issue by starting with the type of harm, not the type of duty. 
This Court has long-held that duties may exist independent of contract and 
indeed co-exist with contractual duties. E.g. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 
48 P.3d 235. Hermansen imposed a duty on real estate agents, "independent of 
any implied or express contracts, to be "honest, ethical, and competent" in 
relationship to real estate buyers." Id. at f 22. Registered investment advisors 
have fiduciary duties which are not express or implied from the written contracts 
with their clients. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-l et seq.; 17 C.F.R. Part 275; S.E.C. v. 
3 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Indeed, the 
insured/insurer relationship is contractual, but in certain situations fiduciary 
duties are imposed. E.g. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799 
(Utah 1985). In such situations, "the existence of a contract between a fiduciary 
and beneficiary is secondary to the nature of a true fiduciary relationship." Bailey 
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. Colo. 1992) (emphasis added). 
Cookietree's attempt to use contracts as a bar to fiduciary duty should be 
rejected. 
True, Cookietree contracted with McLaughlin for employment. Notably, 
in that same contract the parties acknowledged that McLaughlin could become a 
shareholder. A257 Paragraph 3(d) of the Employment Agreement provided: 
"Incentive Stock Option. . . . The issuance of any shares to you will be subject 
to applicable state and federal securities laws. . . . " A258 The parties' contract 
anticipates that the relationship will be more than contractual and that other 
"applicable . . .laws" will govern. Although Cookietree (the entity) had the 
contract, it was Schenk (the individual) and later Gayle Schenk and Rosemann 
who personally committed the breaches of duty. These individuals only had 
power to abuse because of the definitional structure of close corporations. 
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b. Employment Was But One Tool for Harm In an 
Quintessentially Shareholders' Dispute 
Cookietree has chosen to cling to its own characterization of McLaughlin's 
case as a garden variety employment claim2. Cookietree's narrow statement of 
the issue assumes that McLaughlin's claim only implicates employment. 
Cookietree pretends McLaughlin's ownership of shares is wholly irrelevant to 
events. The opposite is true: but for McLaughlin's status as a shareholder, none 
of the events would have taken place. 
In close corporations, freezeouts are seldom only about employment. 
Factually, McLaughlin expanded his employment to ownership and investment in 
the company by purchasing shares. He worked to develop that investment over 
12 years. His performance as Vice President of Operations is unquestioned. 
When Schenk started to consider selling, McLaughlin tried to assert his 
shareholder's right to buy the company, deepening his investment in the 
company. At that time, Schenk's unlawful stock transaction, which secured his 
majority ownership of Cookietree in 1999, was exposed and challenged. 
McLaughlin requested information as a shareholder. Schenk withheld. Schenk 
2
 In fact, on closer examination, Cookietree's statement of the issue in its Brief is 
almost word-for-word the issue as stated in the Berman case. As set forth in 
McLaughlin's opening brief, no fact in the Berman case implicated Berman as a 
stockholder. The dispute in this case begins, revolves around and ends with 
McLaughlin the shareholder. See Opening Brief, p. 49-51. 
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refused to negotiate with McLaughlin or honor his first right of refusal to buy the 
company. Schenk preferred to seek a higher price from the "strategic buyer." 
McLaughlin refused to assure the strategic buyer, sign a non-compete or waive 
his shareholder rights. Motivated by financial gain and self-protection, Schenk 
used his corporate power to put McLaughlin in a position of economic hardship 
so he would have to compromise his shareholder claims. 
McLaughlin's employment was not just terminated. He was thrown out of 
a company in which he had heavily invested and wanted to own: time, effort, 
stock ownership and even family commitment. He was trespassed from the 
property and then told: we'll resolve the employment and stock claims 
"globally." The breach was significant: both to enrich and protect himself, 
Schenk treated his partner in shocking bad faith. The only way to defend is to 
insist there was no duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty" in the first place. 
c. At-Will Employment Carries Legal Limits and Duties 
Cookietree argues that the lawful exercise of a contractual right cannot 
give rise to breach of fiduciary duty. See Appellee's Brief, p. 43. At-will 
employment, however, is not uncircumscribed and carries limits and duties by 
the employer. Where, as here, employment is governed by contract, the law 
implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Cook v. Zions First Nat91 
6 
Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 60-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Furthermore, at-will 
employment cannot be terminated for unlawful reasons. State and federal law 
protect the at-will employee from termination on the basis of gender and racial 
discrimination, disability and age to name a few. Similarly, if a termination 
violates public policy at-will employment may be protected. Peterson v. 
Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992). 
Given these laws and policies it is not inconsistent for this Court to hold 
that an at-will termination of a shareholder, for self-interested and retaliatory 
motives, may form an aspect of breach of fiduciary duty. The timeline in this 
case supports such a finding: 
* McLaughlin works for 12 years as an executive employee without a 
disciplinary episode and is promoted and given pay raises; see Opening 
Brief, Statement of Facts 11 7, 10-12 
* Over time McLaughlin invests his earnings in company stock governed by 
strict transfer restrictions; Id. at 11 13-15, 22, 30, 31 
* McLaughlin asserts shareholder rights and attempts to buy the company; 
Id at 11 34, 38 
* Schenk wants to sell to a strategic buyer who will pay more; Id. at 1 32 
* McLaughlin uncovers a secret stock transaction whereby Schenk shored up 
majority ownership of the company in violation of transfer restrictions; 
Id. at 1 33 
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* Schenk refuses to work with McLaughlin or allow him time to meet Otis' 
offer;3 Id. at 11 39, 41 
* McLaughlin challenges the transaction and asserts rights to Schenk's 
shares; Id. at 11 35, 38, 42 
* McLaughlin makes shareholder requests for information; Id. at 11 47, 50, 
54 
* McLaughlin is frozen out of executive meetings; Id. at 1 45 
* McLaughlin is threatened; Id. at 1 52 
* McLaughlin refuses to cooperate with stock sale to strategic buyer; 
Id. at 11 42, 44, 46, 49 
* Schenk makes McLaughlin persona non grata: Schenk terminates 
McLaughlin without cause and without notice (to which he was 
contractually entitled), cuts his contractual severance to 1992 levels, 
trespasses him from company property and refuses to provide employment 
references; Id. at 11 55-60 
* Transparently, Schenk offers in succeeding days to "globally resolve" both 
McLaughlin's employment and stock claims; Id. at 11 61, 65. 
McLaughlin was not treated with "utmost good faith and loyalty." Termination 
of employment at-will is sometimes just that: at-will termination. Other times, 
depending on the facts and duties implicated, termination of at-will employment 
3
 On 3/30/04, Otis Spunkmeyer, the "strategic buyer" offered to purchase 
Cookietree for $12 million. A1419 The next day, on 3/31/04, McLaughlin 
matched this offer based on his own cash assets, loan approval and verbal 
commitments from outside investors. A1329 McLaughlin asked for a few 
additional days for his financiers to conduct due diligence and put together a 
written offer. A1329 Schenk said "No." {Id.) "I'm going to sell it to Otis." 
A1279 
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can be a retaliatory and bad faith tool. When used by persons in power for their 
personal financial gain termination can be an aspect of breach of fiduciary duty. 
d. Berman and Riblet Are Not Strong Precedent 
Cookietree does not cite to any new or different authority beyond what was 
argued in the Court below. Their strongest cases, Berman and Riblet, have not 
been extensively followed by other courts. Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., 
Ltd., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000); Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 
A.2d 37 (Del. 1996). They appear for the most part in treatises and academic 
articles on close corporations. There is no question that these cases represent the 
minority view, nor does Cookietree contest this assertion. The paucity of 
favorable citing opinions stands in stark contract to courts considering and 
adopting Donahue. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. 328 
N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). Donahue contains a thoughtful discussion of modern 
realities in close corporations and adopts the partnership standard for fiduciary 
duty. This is not a radical statement of the law and it has been recognized and 
followed by a majority of courts considering it. 
Berman and Riblet were distinguished and discussed in the Opening Brief 
and will not be revisited here. See Opening Brief, pp. 48-51. 
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e. Damage to McLaughlin is Not Speculative It Is Palpable 
Attempting to solidify its characterization of this case as "garden variety 
employment," Cookietree asserts that there has been no damage as a shareholder 
(or as articulated by Berman "qua stockholder"). See Appellee's Brief, pp. 41, 
52. It is demonstrative to contrast how McLaughlin started with the present day. 
In 2004 McLaughlin was Vice President of Operations of a company in which he 
and his wife, also a Cookietree executive, collectively owned 10% of the stock. 
He participated daily in the management and operations of the company. Upon 
Greg Schenk's stated desire to sell, McLaughlin had a viable opportunity (and 
contractual right) to buy the company he had been growing and investing in for 
12 years. 
Today, in 2008, McLaughlin is exiled. He does not have any management 
or operations role at Cookietree, but it is still the family's single biggest 
investment. There is no market4 for McLaughlin's shares: he cannot sell them 
or receive market value for this investment. Not only can he not work to 
enhance, protect and develop his investment, he cannot step foot on company 
4
 Cookietree is not publicly traded. The 1999 Shareholder's Agreement (A1076) 
prohibits the transfer of stock except as set forth therein. McLaughlin is also 
subject to a minority discount. These factors and others characterize the unique 
potential for abuse with close corporations and demonstrate the need for Utah to 
adopt the partnership standard of fiduciary duty. 
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property. In 2008 he owns fewer shares than he should and over the past nine 
(9) years accordingly lost significant dividends; Schenk retains ownership of all 
the Anna Schenk shares. He was deprived of the opportunity to purchase the 
company and was retaliated against for trying. In reality, this is a 
quintessentially "shareholders' dispute." 
Cookietree suggests that McLaughlin's right to the Anna Schenk shares is 
speculative. Apparently, Cookietree believes that had Defendants followed the 
1991 Shareholder's Agreement, Cookietree would have had the first option to 
purchase the Anna Schenk shares and would have purchased them. It is hard to 
predict, since Defendants kept the transaction secret. In any event, McLaughlin 
also pled, and thereby preserved, a derivative claim on behalf of the company 
which may be pursued on remand. CI 
In sum, certain legal propositions are unrefuted in Cookietree's brief: 
a. the definition of a close corporation and Cookietree's status as a 
close corporation 
b. the proposition that fiduciary duty arises from relationship, 
irrespective of the existence or non-existence of other contractual 
relationships 
c. it is proper to look to the source of the duty, not the source of the 
injury in determining whether a claim sounds in tort or contract 
d. minority oppression is a form of breach of fiduciary duty 
11 
e. majority power or control cannot be used for individual gain. 
McLaughlin respectfully asks this Court to adopt the Donahue/partnership 
standard of fiduciary duty for close corporations in Utah. 
B. MCLAUGHLIN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO AMEND HIS 
COMPLAINT. 
The proposed Amended Complaint (A 1587) merely articulates a cause of 
action under the fiduciary duty standard proposed in this appeal. It names two 
new defendants since the Waivers themselves were in bad faith and in breach of 
the duty of "utmost good faith and fair dealing." Gayle Schenk and Harold 
Rosemann chose to personally participate in those actions for personal 
preservation and gain. The interested Board treated one shareholder (Schenk) 
more favorably than another (McLaughlin). A1580 They believed these were 
the wishes of the late Boyd Schenk. A1580-1581 
Recognizing that if this Court adopts the proposed standard of fiduciary 
duty for close corporations in Utah the proposed Amended Complaint will be 
appropriate, and since it chose not to address the issue of first impression in this 
appeal, Cookietree raises "prejudice" arguments. The motion to amend the 
complaint was timely at the time it was made in the proceedings below since 
Judge Hilder had invited McLaughlin to articulate his fiduciary duty claim. 
A1509; A1572 The Court asked McLaughlin to articulate "a duty, breach and 
12 
damages, separate from any of the contractual obligations that existed in this 
case." A1508-1509 The most obvious procedural way to do this was through a 
motion to amend. 
C. POST-LITIGATION RATIFICATION BY AN INTERESTED 
BOARD CANNOT BE "VALID AND EFFECTIVE' AS A 
MATTER OF LAW;" QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST TO 
ALLOW MCLAUGHLIN HIS DAY IN COURT 
As part of its ongoing retaliatory and bad faith treatment of McLaughlin, 
Cookietree's Board answered McLaughlin's lawsuit with a "Waiver." The 
"Waiver" said "we don't care" that Schenk acquired 545,200 shares of stock in 
secret and in violation of the then-existing shareholder's agreement. One Board 
member, Gayle Schenk, boldly expressed her anger and lack of regard for 
McLaughlin's rights. See generally, A1090-1095. ("Didn't matter to me if there 
was a conflict of interest . . . " (A 1092) "[McLaughlin is] a threat" and 
Cookietree had the right to breach its contract with him (A 1095)). Given the 
timing of the Waiver (6lA years late), its facial reliance upon an expired contract 
for authority and the layers of conflict of interest the Court should have left the 
issue open for determination at trial. Instead, summary judgment was granted 
and McLaughlin was denied his day in court to challenge both the breach and the 
phony ratification. 
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1. McLaughlin's Opening Brief Marshaled Record Evidence 
Cookietree claims that the opening brief "failed to marshal any record 
evidence that supports the challenged findings on the waiver issues. See 
Appellee's Brief, p. 19 n.7. This is incorrect. On pages 29-33 of the opening 
brief, paragraphs 66-83 the evidence is marshaled in accordance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9). 
2. The Nullifying Effect of the 1999 Shareholder's Agreement 
Cookietree argues that, even in 2005, Board action could still be taken 
under authority of the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement. This argument ignores 
the plain language of another contract: that in 1999 the same parties declared 
that very agreement to be "terminated and of no further force and effect." 
A1080. No court can "'alter the rights agreed to by the parties' by appeal to a 
more general sense of fairness." Kraatz v. Heritage, 2003 UT App 201, \ 22, 
71 P.3d 188, 194; Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 2002 UT 62, f 19, 
52 P.3d 1179 ("We will not make a better contract for the parties than they have 
made for themselves. Nor will we avoid the contract's plain language to achieve 
an 'equitable' result."); Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47,1 6, 980 
P.2d 685 (stating courts "may not rewrite [a] contract ... if the language is 
14 
clear"). The plain terms mean that the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement, the 
purported authority for the 2005 Waivers (R230), was "of no further force and 
effect." A1080 The language of the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement anticipated 
that it would expire. A211 at f 13. 
3. The Waivers Were Conflicting Interest Transactions, 
i. The Issue Was Preserved Below 
Cookietree also claims, incorrectly, that McLaughlin never argued that the 
Waivers were conflicting interest transactions in the Court below. See Appellee's 
Brief, p. 15, n.6, p. 22. In the Opening Brief, McLaughlin cited to A1007. 
Other pages in the same summary judgment memorandum preserve the issue: 
A998 ("Greg Schenk's role in the ex post facto 'ratification' should be summarily 
set aside as he could not have been a 'disinterested director' under Utah Code 
Ann. §§16-10a-850 through 853 and should not have voted to ratify the transfer. 
His spouse, Gayle, obviously, should not have voted either.") During oral 
argument, McLaughlin argued "[t]he Schenks should not have voted. They were 
the ones who personally benefited from the acquisition of the stock and so for 
them to be able six years later to come and vote to waive the contractual 
provisions by which they had been previously bound disqualified them. There's 
a question of fact as to whether or not they had a conflict of interest in voting on 
15 
their own self interest transaction. A1753 at 37; see also p. 34 (challenging 
"board members conflicts of interest in ratifying th[e] transaction six years later" 
and p. 38 ". . . if the board member is the beneficiary, the interested person, he 
should not be able on behalf of the corporation and acting as a board member to 
ratify that same action. . .") 
ii. The Waivers Are The Relevant "Transaction" 
Just like with the close corporation issue, Cookietree did not brief the 
Waivers as "conflicting interest transactions" and chose instead to incorrectly 
assert that the issue was not preserved below. The Appellee's Brief devotes one 
short paragraph (p.23) to the substance of McLaughlin's argument summarily 
stating he is "wrong" and that the Board Waiver is an "action respecting a 
transaction" instead of a transaction. 
The 1999 transfer of stock to Greg Schenk from his father's widow cannot 
be the URBCA "transaction" for an obvious reason. The Anna Schenk transfer 
remained concealed from 1999 until 2004 when McLaughlin discovered it. 
There was no "Directors' action" until the Board Waiver in 2005. The 1999 
transfer was not authorized or even mentioned by Board Minutes, as other stock 
transactions had been (A1003; A1594; A1097) and certainly no one voted on it. 
Schenk, presumably acting in concert and in secret with Harold Rosemann, the 
16 
company Secretary, obtained the shares with no directors' action at all. The 
"directors' conflicting interest transaction" occurred when, after litigation, the 
Board attempted to use a provision from an expired 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement to waive the transfer restrictions and ratify the secret acts of Schenk 
more than six years before. 
Cookietree argues that transactions require two or more parties and the 
Waiver was "merely an action . . . respecting a transaction to which it was not a 
party." Black's Law Dictionary defines a "transaction" as an: 
Act of transaction or conducting any business; negotiation; 
management; proceeding; that which is done; an affair . . . 
Something which has taken place whereby a cause of action has 
arisen. It must therefore consist of an act or agreement or several 
acts or agreements having some connection with each other, in 
which more than one person is concerned, and by which the legal 
relations of such persons between themselves are altered. It is a 
broader term than "contract." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 1983). The Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act does not define "transaction;" only a "director's conflicting 
interest transaction" is defined as "a transaction effected . . . by the 
corporation." Cookietree's Board effected the Waivers. It was an "act or 
agreement" by which McLaughlin's "legal relations" were "altered." 
Lastly, Cookietree cites the Official Commentary to URBCA 850(b)(1) 
(2007) as stating "to constitute a director's conflicting interest transaction there 
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must first be a transaction by the corporation . . . in which the director has a 
financial interest." Schenk had a financial interest in the Waiver. For one thing, 
it formed a defense to McLaughlin's breach of contract action against him. It 
purported to secure his personal ownership of the Anna Schenk shares and 
dividends from 1999 forward. This Court can and should find that the Waivers 
were transactions. 
a. The Board's Conflict - Rosemann 
On appeal, Cookietree does not defend Greg Schenk's "conflicting 
interest" or that of his Board member spouse, Gayle. Instead, Cookietree 
devotes pages in its brief to the rehabilitation of Harold Rosemann, the third 
Board member to sign the 2005 Waiver. 
As a first defense, Cookietree again asserts that the issue of Rosemann's 
conflicting interest was not raised below. In McLaughlin's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' 2005 Motion for Summary Judgment, McLaughlin 
properly raised and preserved the issues with Rosemann: 
* Harold Rosemann is an employee of Cookietree, Inc. subject to 
at-will termination. [He] has no employment contract and 
reports directly to Greg Schenk. Certainly there is a fact 
question on Harold's freedom to object. Greg [Schenk] 
acknowledges that in all the years at Cookietree, he has 
personally terminated five or six people. They have all been 
high-level employees and at least three were also Cookietree 
shareholders." A1007 and fn 3 (citations omitted). 
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* At the time of the Anna Schenk transfer in 1999, Harold 
Rosemann - who by definition as Secretary would have helped 
facilitate the transaction - was himself given additional 
Cookietree Shares. A1003 
See also A415, A415 n3; A1580; A1599 
Unwittingly showing another angle of close corporation issues, Cookietree 
next engages in hair-splitting about Harold Rosemann's employer: Cookietree, 
Inc. and not Greg Schenk the individual. The Waiver ratified a old stock 
transaction in which Greg Schenk secured his majority ownership of the 
company. Greg Schenk is also the President and CEO. Rosemann serves on the 
Board, arguably at the whim of Schenk who controls the majority of the shares. 
Schenk has personally fired employees, shareholders and Board Members in the 
past who have disagreed with him. A1074 
It strains credulity to suggest that since "Cookietree, Inc." was 
Rosemann's employer that he was unconcerned about his ability as an at-will 
employee to defy Greg Schenk. After all, a total freezeout had recently been 
waged against Rosemann's co-worker and fellow shareholder McLaughlin when 
he asserted his rights in opposition to Schenk. In every way, Rosemann is at the 
mercy of the Schenks: the Board they control votes on his position as Secretary, 
the shares they control appoint him to the Board and he is an at-will employee at 
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a company where Schenk is President and CEO. It cannot be disputed that 
Schenk has the power to terminate all of these, and through his control of the 
Board, terminate payment of dividends. 
Perhaps most significantly, Rosemann received a quid pro quo at the time 
of the Anna Schenk transfer in 1999. He received additional Cookietree shares, 
ostensibly in exchange for facilitating a secret transaction outside the plain terms 
of the 1991 Shareholder's Agreement. Rosemann stood to personally gain from 
the Waiver (no scrutiny of his role, security in his share ownership with 
dividends therefrom and pacification of Schenk) and had nothing to lose. He 
compromised his integrity back in 1999. 
Given these realities, this Court may find that Rosemann was not a 
"qualified director" because he had a "financial professional or employment 
relationship with a second director who does have a conflicting interest respecting 
the transaction, which relationship would, in the circumstances, reasonably be 
expected to exert an influence on [his] judgment when voting on the transaction." 
The statute does not require a strict definition of "employer" only a "financial, 
employment or professional relationship." At a minimum, there was a question 
of fact about whether or not this is so. 
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b. The Shareholders' Waivers Under the Contract 
Dangerously, Cookietree argues that it is the 1991 Shareholders' 
Agreement, not URBCA that governed the 2005 Shareholders' Waivers. 
McLaughlin's first argument against all the Waivers is that the authority upon 
which they rely to waive share transfer restrictions was, at the time, void and of 
no further force and effect. See Argument C.2, above. The shareholders, 
therefore, had no contractual authority to waive in 2005. Those parties are 
bound by their own agreement. Id. 
c. Required Disclosures and Notice 
Cookietree argues that since it may be implied that Harold Rosemann 
already knew the omitted information, the Schenk's failure to make "required 
disclosures" under the statute is inconsequential. As directors with "conflicting 
interests] regarding the transaction" Greg Schenk and Harold Rosemann's shares 
were not "qualified shares." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-102(27)(b)(i). It matters 
not whether "required disclosures" were made to or known by them, because 
they were not entitled to vote under the safe harbor, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
853. 
The shareholders entitled to vote were Jerry Schmeckl, Sam McLaughlin 
and Kim McLaughlin. It is undisputed that neither McLaughlin was given notice 
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of the vote, a prerequisite to Shareholders' Action under the statute 
(shareholders' action is effective if a quorum exists "after notice to shareholders 
describing the director's conflicting interest transaction . . . and required 
disclosure. . ."). Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-853(l). 
McLaughlin challenged the purported Shareholders' Action (see Addendum 
2 to Opening Brief) on the basis of a lack of "notice to shareholders" and 
"required disclosures." The only record evidence about "required disclosures" 
to Jerry Schmeckl is that Schenk called him on the phone, for about five minutes, 
and told him McLaughlin was contesting the transfer of the shares" and asked 
him to sign. A1073 There are no disclosures listed on the face of the 
Shareholders' Waiver. 
In summary, even if Schmeckl alone were a "quorum" there is no basis to 
find Schenk made "required disclosures" to him. The material omissions are 
listed at page 30 of the Opening Brief. 
4. The Bylaws 
On Appeal, McLaughlin challenged the Shareholders' Waivers as a 
violation of the Bylaws, not the Board Waivers. See Opening Brief, p. 71. 
Cookietree's argument, then, justifying the Board Waivers under the Bylaws is 
not relevant to this appeal. Irrefutably, at Cookietree shareholder action by 
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consent may occur without a meeting if such action is "signed by all of the 
shareholders entitled to vote with respect to the subject matter thereof." 
Cookietree Bylaws § 2.12; A1037-1037 It is undisputed that this did not occur 
since Sam and Kim McLaughlin were frozen out. 
Since it cannot justify the Shareholders' Waivers under the wholly-ignored 
Bylaws provisions, Cookietree again asserts that the nullified Shareholders' 
Agreement as authority for their actions. It is not necessary to analyze which, by 
Bylaws or a Shareholders' Agreement, has supremacy since these same 
shareholders voted and agreed that the 1991 Shareholders' Agreement was 
"terminated and of no further force and effect." A1080 Arguably, though the 
Shareholders' Agreement once permitted a waiver of transfer restrictions and the 
Bylaws governed how that could be accomplished. The 2005 shareholders' 
action without a meeting was not "signed by all of the shareholders entitled to 
vote." 
5. Timeliness As A Question Of Fact 
It is obvious McLaughlin was disadvantaged by the ratification 6V2 years 
later: on the basis of the Waivers, his lawsuit was dismissed. 
On appeal, McLaughlin simply asks that this Court apply its still-viable 
1969 statement of the law: that the question of the validity of a ratification "is a 
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question of fact and inference to be drawn therefrom." Lake Creek Irrigation 
Co. v. Clyde, 451 P.2d 375, 377 (Utah 1969). Cookietree attempts to 
distinguish Lake Creek since it did not hinge on timeliness. The hinge, however, 
was "self-interest." McLaughlin does not argue against a corporations URBCA 
right to ratify; such a holding would be against public policy. This Court 
recognized long-ago that, if questioned, such acts, when challenged are not prima 
facie effective but are subject to a factual determination (and therefore not ripe 
for summary judgment). 
This Court should find that it was error for Judge Hilder to conclude that 
the Waivers were "valid and effective as a matter of law" and remand to allow 
this question to be presented to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents good facts upon which to pronounce the standard of 
fiduciary for close corporations in Utah. If this Honorable Court declines to do 
so, a gross inequity will result. For McLaughlin, the retaliation and punishment 
will continue. The Board (Schenk and Rosemann) would be free to authorize 
extravagant bonuses and salary for its executives (Schenk and Rosemann) and 
discontinue dividends (harming only the non-employee shareholders, namely the 
McLaughlins). Schenk could award himself additional stock grants. Schenk 
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could personally buy a building and have Cookietree pay him exorbitant rents, 
thereby decreasing the net profit and reducing dividends. Schenk could employ 
his family for high salaries. The potential for abuse is limitless, not just for 
McLaughlin but for every minority shareholder in Utah. 
Utah has thousands of close corporations. Many of these businesses 
depend on minority investments to finance their ventures, which in turn fuel our 
economy. If the rights of minority shareholders are not recognized, this could 
have a negative effect in Utah on the ability of small entrepreneurial business 
ventures to attract investors. By holding Greg Schenk and the rest of 
Cookietree's Board accountable for their bad faith freezeout tactics, Utah is 
applying sound policy. "A court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is 
'an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the 
law to say that the plaintiff is [or is not] entitled to protection.'" Webb v. Univ. 
of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 9, 125 P.3d 906. 
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